[Avodah] Rambam's naturalism

Micha Berger micha at aishdas.org
Mon Jun 15 13:59:12 PDT 2009


On Tue, Mar 24, 2009 at 04:29:17PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
: >The nearest I could find was (from about 1/5th of the way into pereq 18):
: >>This benefit is very great in the case of prophets, and varies
: >>according to the degree of their prophetic faculty: as it varies in
: >>the case of pious and good men according to their piety and
: >>uprightness.

: >But notice he's saying that HP is in proportion to their nevu'ah (or to
: >chassidus and tzidqus), not that it actually is their nevu'ah.

: See Ibn Falaqera, Moreh HaMoreh, at the end of 3:18 (he cites 3:52 and 
: 2:12).

It took me nearly 3 months to look this up, but... He doesn't so much
site 2:12, as much as point you there where his explanation really
resides.

But in any case, here's the snippet I would focus on in 2:12:
    It is now clear that the action of bodies upon each other, according
    to their forms, prepares the substance for receiving the action of
    an incorporeal being, or Form. The existence of actions of purely
    incorporeal beings, in every case of change that does not originate
    in the mere combination of elements, is now firmly established.
    These actions do not depend on impact, or on a certain distance.
    They are termed "influence" (or "emanation"), on account of their
    similarity to a water-spring. The latter sends forth water in all
    directions, has no peculiar side for receiving or spending its
    contents: it springs forth on all sides, and continually waters both
    neighbouring and distant places. In a similar manner incorporeal
    beings, in receiving power and imparting it to others, are not
    limited to a particular side, distance, or time. They act
    continually; and whenever an object is sufficiently prepared, it
    receives the effect of that continuous action, called "influence"
    (or "emanation"). God being incorporeal, and everything being the
    work of Him as the efficient cause, we say that the Universe has
    been created by the Divine influence, and that all changes in the
    Universe emanate from Him. In the same sense we say that He caused
    wisdom to emanate from Him and to come upon the prophets. In all
    such cases we merely wish to express that an incorporeal Being,
    whose action we call "influence," has produced a certain effect. The
    term "influence" has been considered applicable to the Creator on
    account of the similarity between His actions and those of a spring.
    There is no better way of describing the action of an incorporeal
    being than by this analogy; and no term can be found that would
    accurately describe it.

I see the perfected intellect as described in 3:18 as being the form
that is the "prepar[ation] of the substance for receiving the action of
an incorporeal being, or Form".

: >However, the fate of a bird isn't a product of what's most appropriate
: >for that particular bird. Unlike the case of events that occur to people,
: >or at least to those who get HP. It's hashgachah minis or hashgachah
: >kelalis, depending on whether the rishon is looking to the fate of the
: >species (HM) or to the Divine Wisdom inherent in natural law (HK) --
: >but it's still hashgachah.

: Universals are a problem for the Rambam.  See Falaqera again, at the 
: beginning of 3:18, summarizing Plato and Aristotle (unfortunately 
: without specific references).

Also, Wolfson discusses it, as you showed me back in vol 12.

However, that ambivalence of the Rambam's doesn't touch my understanding
of the Morah. I see 3:18 as clearly saying that "person" is a fuzzy set
defined by yedi'ah.

: >Whereas I'm arguing that the debate between Epicurus and Aristotle
: >was about this exact point. Epicurus thought that there were events
: >that "just happened", whereas Aristotle believed that events come
: >from intellects turning the potential into the actual, and therefore
: >everything can ultimately be traced back to Divine Wisdom. The only
: >thing is, that Wisdom usually is that there should be a rule, and not
: >that this particular case should have this particular outcome.

: You need to add qualifiers here.  Epicurus thought that all events just 
: happened; Aristotle thought that many events come from physical law.

: >When seen in contrast to Epicurus, because Aristo believed in teleological
: >causes (things happening for a purpose), he did have a non-random
: >universe. All of nature was the product of someone's will.

: This is inaccurate.  Not all of nature; much of nature.  Some of it is 
: random.  Descartes was the first (since the Kalam) to deny randomness.

In MN 3:17, he gives five theories regarding hashgachah [HP and HK]. Note
the body of these theories take it for granted we're talking about Divine
Action in this world, not degrees of nevu'ah (which is the topic of a
different part of the Moreh anyay). In 3:17 he ammends the 5th theory,
that of Chazal, giving a more recent understanding, and then in ch 18 he
gives his own. (In which he uses the fuziness of the concept of "person"
to say that all people get HP means that homo sapiens get more or less
HP depending on their yedi'ah.)

#1: "There is no Providence at all for anything in the Universe; all parts
of the Universe, the heavens and what they contain, owe their origin to
accident and chance; there exists no being that rules and governs them
or provides for them. This is the theory of Epicurus, who assumes also
that the Universe consists of atoms, that these have combined by chance,
and have received their various forms by mere accident...."

#2: "Whilst one part of the Universe owes its existence to Providence, and
is under the control of a ruler and governor, another part is abandoned
and left to chance. This is the view of Aristotle about Providence,
and I will now explain to you his theory. He holds that God controls
the spheres and what they contain: therefore the individual beings in
the spheres remain permanently in the same form. ... From the existence
of the spheres other beings derive existence, which are constant in
their species but not in their individuals: in the same manner it
is said that Providence sends forth [from the spheres to the earth]
sufficient influence to secure the immortality and constancy of the
species, without securing at the same time permanence for the individual
beings of the species. But the individual beings in each species have
not been entirely abandoned, that portion of the materia prima which
has been purified and refined, and has received the faculty of growth,
is endowed with properties that enable it to exist a certain time,
to attract what is useful and to repel what is useless."

So, while Friedlander's translation uses the word "chance", the Rambam's
description of it is hashgachah minis "constant in species and not
individuals" and hashgachah kelalis "that portion ... which has been
purified and refined, and has received the faculty of growth, is endowed
with properties that enable it to exist a certain time..."

That nature is described as a non-abandonment is HK as opposed to
Epicurian randomness.

On a subject that came up since, on Mon, Jun 15, 2009 at 9:11am EDT
R M Cohen wrote:
: I may have a faulty memory of those discussions..
: but as far as I remember they were NOT "a non-resolved issue"
: There were those Areivim members that "believed" or that "it's only fair
: that" there s/be be HP for goyim.
: NO proofs. NO sources.

I do remember it differently.

HP based on yedi'ah would include HP for chassidei umos ha'olam. CUhO get
olam haba, which leshitas haRambam presumes more than sufficient yedi'ah
for HP. (And note that the Rambam's examples in III:18 are named Zeid,
Amr and Kaled, not Zechariah, Avraham and Kaleiv.)

Universal HP means universal, across all of domeim, tzomei'ach
and chai al achas kamah vekamah all medaberim. See the LR's
Iggeres at <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/protis.pdf>
(thanks to RYZ). My summary is at
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol09/v09n042.shtml#12>. RGStudent
posted a summary of the Sifsei Chaim (who is
choleiq on the LR on some points but not this one) at
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol12/v12n004.shtml#07>. The current
theory ties HP to the fact that things only exist due to Ratzon haBorei,
and therefore all events must be according to the Ratzon. Also, Ramchal,
Derekh Hashem 2:1:2.

And the notion that HP on domeim tzomeiach vechai is only where it impacts
medabrim is the Ramaq's (according to the Sifsei Chaim), not the Ramban's,
the Rambam's, nor the Gra's universalism. He explicitly contrasts the two.
AND the Ramaq says medabeir, not Yehudi.

The Sifsei Chaim (Pirqei Emunah veHashgachah I, maamar 5, the one beyond
RGS's post, is about how "teva" is just a term for indirect hashgachah.

This was also RnTK's recent error. Those who say that HP is not universal,
do not define it by criteria that excludes nachriim. Those who do say that
nachriim are different in kind in a manner that would impact HP according
to the first shitah happen to also believe that even a domeim is subject
to HP.

So to exclude nachriim from hashgachah would require a mix of shitos we
didn't find given by any baal mesorah.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow
micha at aishdas.org        man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries
http://www.aishdas.org   about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                       - Rav Yisrael Salanter



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