[Avodah] Tiqun Olam

[Michael Makovi]

I just read Kuzari 2:47-48, where I realized that according to Rav
Hirsch, the Kuzari (i.e. the king) is correct and the Haver is
incorrect. Rav Hirsch's criticism's against the Rambam (19 Letters)
fully and completely apply to the Haver as well, and the Kuzar King's
remarks are in marked line with Rav Hirsch's own beliefs.

I then remembered that which I had read a few months ago, Howard I.
Levine's "Enduring and Transitory Elements in the Philosophy of Samson
Raphael Hirsch" (Spring 1963). This essay, tthough otherwise rife with
error (see Rabbi Danziger's rejoinder at
http://www.stevens.edu/golem/llevine/rsrh/Clarification%20of%20RSRH_danziger.pdf),
does one make very true and essential point, the same that I make on
the Kuzari:

In brief, Rav Hirsch's machloket with Rambam is also his machloket
with Kuzari and Ramhal. That is, whereas Rambam saw the purpose of
life as the perfection of the intellect and cleavage to the Active
Intellect (and G-d) via metaphysical speculation, and the Kuzari saw
the purpose of life as the perfection of holiness and cleavage to the
Inyan haEloki via performance of the ritual mitzvot, and Ramhal
similarly - by contrast, Rav Hirsch saw the purpose of life to be
justice and righteousness in mundane life.

As Levine notes, "It is through their [the mizvot] effect upon both
nature and history that, according to Hirsch, they enable Israel to
fulfill its mission to humanity." Additionally, Rav Hirsch, in a few
places, explicitly says that the duty and purpose of man and life is
tzeded u-mishpat; see for example his comment on G-d's musings over
Sodom and Amorah, about Avraham teaching his children tzedek
u-mishpat.

Further, Levine notes, "Rabbi Moses Chaim Luzzato provides a sharp
antithesis to the Hirschian view." Indeed, I distinctly remember an
incident a few years ago, at yeshiva: my havruta asked me what I
thought the purpose of life was, and I described that which was
apparent from Rav Hirsch's corpus. My havruta was astounded at my
words, and pulled out Messilat Yesharim's introduction. I was not
fazed; I told him that Rav Hirsch disagreed with Ramhal. Now I see
that Levine would agree with me.

Levine then goes on to adduce Rav Hirsch's sixfold classification of
the mitzvot in Horeb as showing his emphasis on ethics and justice. I
enjoyed this because I independently made precisely the same diyuk
when I contributed to Wikipedia's article on "Tikun Olam". (I
contributed the material at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tikkun_olam,
s.v. "Building a model society" and "Practical Physical/Social/Worldly
Effects of Mitzvot"; although the material has been extensively
reorganized by others, I am the one who initially contributed most of
the material. I am also responsible for the extensive citations from
Ramhal on that same page.)

Also, in the footnotes to that same Wikipedia article, I cited Rabbi
Danziger and Dr. Judith Bleich as upholding my interpretation of Rav
Hirsch's upholding a sociological and temporal conception of tikkun
olam.

Regarding Kabbalah, Levine rightly notes, "It need be stressed that
though Hirsch's sharpest criticisms are directed against practical
mysticism and its performances, the logic of his position requires his
opposition to the very basis of the Kabbalah: a belief in
supra-mundane worlds and the effects of the religious act in spheres
not directly related to man and his world."

Regarding the Kuzari, Levine rightly notes, "Again, in contrast to
Hirsch, the Mitzvot do not merely represent an instrument for the
fulfillment of our mission to the nations. Insofar as Halevi is
concerned, the ethical and moral content of the Torah, irrespective of
its vital importance as the first step in our religious life, cannot
be regarded as the higher purpose and fulfillment of Judaism. The
revelational laws are distinguished from the moral or rational laws in
that they are the higher stage of religious experience and are a
distinctive trait of Jewish religion."

Michael Makovi