[Avodah] Love/Mercy as a Factor in Halakhic

[Michael Makovi]

In reply to two of R' Yitzhak Grossman's posts,
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol26/v26n076.shtml#11, and
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol26/v26n076.shtml#12

R' Yitzhak Grossman replied with a ruling by Rabbi Uziel, decrying the
use of moral/emotional feelings and compassion and love, etc., in
deciding a specific case, viz. whether a man is liable to pay child
support for a child born to him out of wedlock. I will have to read
this later, as the Hebrew will take me some fair time to wade through,
but I thank him for this.

On the other hand, Rabbi Angel cites a case (in Loving Truth and
Peace, p. 108) where Rabbi Uziel ruled, on the basis of compassion and
mercy, that a man must pay child support for a child he had with a
gentile woman. Rabbi Uziel says, in no uncertain terms, that even
though this child is not halakhically his child, nevertheless, he
says, this man cannot use halakha to avoid a moral obligation he has.
Rabbi Uziel says that this child is nevertheless the man's
flesh-and-blood, and that even if halakhically there is no familial
relationship, nevertheless, the man must pay child support. I haven't
seen Rabbi Uziel inside (Mishpatei Uziel 5724 #4), but he seems to be
relying davka on extra-halakhic morality; Rabbi Uziel even closes the
teshuva saying that this is all because "derachayah darchei no'am
v'chol netivoteiah shalom".

This apparent contradiction would seem to tzarich iyun gadol indeed.

The difference that R' Grossman makes between bein adam l'havero and
bein adam laMakom seems valid, if we modify it a bit. I seem to recall
Rabbi Angel citing/quoting(?) Rabbi Uziel to the effect that when it
is bein adam l'havero, and ruling in one's favor will be ruling in the
other's detriment, then in that case, the law must cut through the
mountain, and one may not rule in favor of the poor. However, in a
case where there is only one party, and ruling by mercy/love will not
cause a loss to anyone else, then truth may be somewhat modified in
favor of peace.

The question remains, however, how Rabbi Uziel could exclude love and
mercy and peace from consideration in paying child support for a child
born out of wedlock, but utilize these notions regarding a child born
to an intermarriage of a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother. Whatever
factors exist to include or exclude considerations of hesed and
ahavah, would seem to apply equally to both.

As for the novel nature of the lenient ruling on the cows (treif
because of stomach incision?), I will admit, these seems rather
standard. Perhaps (pure speculation by me) the particular nature of
the given treifa was almost unanimously ruled to be treif by everyone
else, and Rabbi Uziel had to rely on an extremely minority opinion? I
don't know, but Rabbis Angel and Hayim David Halevy both seem to
regard this case as particular novel, the latter citing it as
paradigmatic of Rabbi Uziel's unique philosophy, so apparently there
was *something* about this case unique to Rabbi Uziel. I invite anyone
to see Rabbi Uziel in the original at Mishpatei Uziel 5710 #3.

In any case, I'm more amazed by Rabbi Halevy's saying that Beit Hillel
won because they ruled leniently; does this not sound exactly like
what is proclaimed to be a Conservative canard? I was simply blown
away by this assertion of Rabbi Halevy's; if he hadn't said it, I
myself never would.

Michael Makovi