[Avodah] childbirth as a time of sakana

[Chana Luntz]

Catching up on old Avodah posts which I have not had a chance to respond to,
I see that RDE has posted the following from Igros Moshe:

> Igros Moshe (Y.D. 2:74): Concerning inducing premature childbirth.
> 
> In my humber opinion it is prohibited to induce premature childbirth
> because childbirth in its natural time in the natural way is not
> considered a danger at all. Since G-d created the world to be fruitful
> and multiply, there is no question that he created it that it should be
> for beracha and not for danger. Furthermore He commanded the obligation
> to have children. It is not logical that there would be a command to
> place one's self in danger in order to fulfil the mitzva of having
> children. Especially since women don't even have a mitzva to have
> children that we would say that the Torah is giving them the option of
> placing themselves in danger in order to have children.. We must
> conclude that there is absolutely no danger in childbirth at all. That
> mean that G-d promised that there would never be danger in childbirth.
> This that it happens that women die during childbirth is only because
> they were liable to punishment as is stated in Shabbos (31). "There are
> three sins for which women die during childbirth". According to this
> reasoning it is only when childbirth is in its natural time that there
> is a promise that there is no inherent danger. The punishment that is
> the result of the sin of the Tree of Knowledge is only to have birth
> pains and not death chas v'shalom! However when they want to induce
> premature labor there is no guarantee of safety. Consequently the woman
> is placed in danger by inducing premature labor because without G-d
> promise there is danger. Therefore it is prohibited to induce premature
> labor except when there is danger to wait as we have mentioned.

[Hebrew deleted as it only comes out as ??? in my digest anyway]

Do you not think that he either resiles from this in Igeros Moshe Orech
Chaim Chelek Daled siman 105:6 or perhaps realises that the way this is
written leads itself to significant misunderstanding?

After all, in this later teshuva, after referring to the teshuva you quote
above  he adds "hayinu d'metzad hametziut ika b'leida sakana" and
"sheb'etzem m'tzad hateva yesh b'zeh gum inyan sakana k'dita sham beshabbat
daf 32 uked'ita gum betanchuma" which I confess seems to me to be
acknowledging that something is absent from the earlier teshuva, if not
incontradiction of it.  This is despite the later qualifier "aval hu hvtacha
shelo yiye bzeh l'olam shum sakana".

And whether or not one wishes to say that in this later teshuva RMF is in
fact drawing back from what he appears to state so boldly in the earlier
teshuva, I think it very hard to take the earlier teshuva on face value.

After all, it is completely accepted in the sources that a yoledet hi
k'chola sheyesh bo sakana (as stated explicitly in Shulchan Aruch Orech
Chaim siman 329 si'if 1) with the consequence that, as stated in the
following words of the Shulchan Aruch "umechalelin aleha b'shabbat l'kol
mashetztricha".  And the gemora in shabbat 128b clearly regards the fact
that we are mechallel shabbas for such a woman as a p'shita.

But if the literal meaning of the words written above by Rav Moshe were
correct, then it is most definitely not such a pshita. After all, it would
seem, if one understand the words written by Rav Moshe in their most
straightforward way, then only those women who have committed the three sins
referred to in the mishna are in danger of their lives, and why on earth
would we assume, and what gives us the right to assume, that our wives and
mothers fall into that category?  We don't seem to make the same assumption
about men crossing bridges or the like (that being the analogous situation
for men brought in Shabbat 32a comparable to the Mishna on 31b that Rav
Moshe is referring to).  It would seem extremely odd if we were to predicate
our behaviour vis a vis shabbas on the assumption that the person we are
being mechallel shabbas for is a rasha.  And if one were to take the words
quoted above completely literally ie "childbirth in its natural time in the
natural way is not considered a danger at all" then how can one provide any
justification whatsoever for being mechalel shabbas in relation to such
childbirth?

And yet it is a ma'aseh b'chol yom (or should I say, b'chol shabbas) that we
are mechallel shabbas for the sake of a woman in childbirth.

Now I agree that Rav Moshe here is tackling one of the fundamental questions
I have had for a long time, which is, how is it that women are allowed to
let themselves get pregnant, given that they know that by so doing they will
be placing themselves in a matzav of a chola sheyesh bo sakana, and without
even an obligation to do so (or at most a rabbinic obligation)?  And
likewise how can a man get a woman pregnant, knowing he will be putting her
into such a matzav, mitzvah or no mitzvah?  Does not pikuach nefesh
override?

And maybe at least his second teshuva on the subject could be take to be
suggesting that it is appropriate, at least in this instance and contrary to
our usual injunction not to rely upon miracles, to have faith/trust in
Hashem to override what Rav Moshe does there appear to acknowledge is the
metziut/teva (and note of course were this not so, and the original passage
was to be taken literally, we would expect to see no maternal deaths amongst
non Jews, because they are not commanded in chala, nida and neiros, so
cannot be punished for a failure to perform them).  However, even such faith
can at most be only taken so far, because I doubt anybody, including Rav
Moshe, would condone a husband taking the view that since his wife was
clearly a tzadekes (or at least makpid in chala, nida and neiros), he was
not going to be machalel shabbas on her account and take her to hospital.

Regards

Chana