[Avodah] Some thoughts on Shemonah Perakim

[Michael Makovi]

I just finished studying Shemonah Perakim, so let me give some random thoughts.

An analysis of the Shemonah Perakim by Professor Lawrence Kaplan.
http://www.edah.org/backend/coldfusion/search/document.cfm?title=An%20Introduction%20To%20Maimonides%C2%92%20%C2%93Eight%20Chapters%C2%94&hyperlink=Kaplan1%2Ehtml&type=JournalArticle&category=Major%20Religious%20Thinkers%20Past%20and%20Present&authortitle=Dr&firstname=Lawrence&lastname=Kaplan&pubsource=The%20Edah%20Journal%202%3A2&authorid=256&pdfattachment=kaplan2%5F2%2Epdf

His central thesis is that Rambam's goal was to create a virtue ethic
in which obedience to the Law has its value, but that obedience is
nevertheless subordinate to virtue. Within virtue, moral virtue is
subordinate to rational virtue.

In other words, keeping the mitzvot helps on maintain the Mean.
Maintaining the mean helps one attain moral virtue, which in turn
leads to rational virtue. In the end, the only true value of life is
to perfect the rational intellect and thereby gain immortality.

Very fascinating essay which clarified Rambam's overall philosophy in
general and his intent in Shemonah Perakim in particular.

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A few thoughts of my own regarding Shemonah Perakim chapter six, the
chapter about the man who obeys because of moral virtue, and the man
who obeys because of God's command.

Rambam says that in "rational" commands (mitzvot; murder, theft,
etc.), one should obey them due to his own moral virtue. On the other
hand, in non-rational commands (hukim; shatnez, kashrut, giluy arayot,
although I personally cannot understand why giluy arayot is not a
rational command, but be that as it may...), one should obey them
because of G-d's command.

Professor Isadore Twersky and others interpret this as a dialectic
between autonomy and heteronomy; in rational commands, one should
follow his own autonomous instinct and virtue, while in non-rational,
one should follow G-d's inscrutable and heteronomous command. But
Kaplan disagrees; chapter four already taught us that the non-rational
commands of the Torah serve as practical instruments to bring us to
the Mean. Therefore, following G-d's heteronomous command in this case
is not because we are to develop obedience to His inscrutable will as
a value in and of itself, but rather, because these commands only
indirectly affect the moral virtue, whereas the rational commands
directly relate to moral virtue. Obeying G-d's command for the sake of
obedience has little if any value for Rambam. Rational commands are to
be followed autonomously for the sake of their moral virtue;
non-rational commands are to be followed heteronomously, for there is
nothing intrinsically morally questionable in them, and had God not
commanded them, there'd be no objection to eating treif, etc.

Thus, Rambam shows that virtue is to be exalted over obedience; the
ultimate value is rational virtue, followed by moral virtue, and
obedience has value only insofar as it leads to these.

Now, my own thoughts:

I am inclined to follow the philosophy of Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits, as
expounded by David Hazony in "Why Judaism Has Laws", in Azure
magazine: Judaism, says Rabbi Berkovits, extols the practical
sociological effect of the deed over the intent of the performer.
Whether or not one is charitable in his heart is less important than
whether he actually helps the poor. This is almost the exact opposite
of Rambam, who extolled virtue over obedience. However, Rambam's
philosophy is still useful for us: in moral commands, I'd nevertheless
say that ultimately, G-d does want the moral virtue to be ingrained in
our moral fiber. As Dennis Prager says, "Judaism would love that you
give charity out of the goodness of your heart. But the Torah knows
that if it waited for this, it would wait an awfully long time. So it
says give 10%, and if your heart catches up, great. If not and/or in
the meantime, good has still been done". So while Rambam says virtue
is greater than obedience, I'd say the opposite, BUT, I'd say that
virtue is still a value, and hopefully, in the end, the moral virtue
will catch up to one's deed. However, in non-rational commands, such
as kashrut, this is not necessary. Following the philosophy of Rav
Hirsch, in which these commands have educational and symbolic and
training value, there is no moral virtue related to these commands.
Thus, there is no need for one to have a moral revulsion to treif,
etc. On the contrary, this subverts its educational value. Rabbis
Berkovits and Isidore Epstein say similarly, saying that kashrut
trains one in self-control. Dayan Grunfeld in Horeb in a footnote to
the introduction, criticizes Rabbi Berkovits for this idea, but
nevertheless, all these thinkers agree that one way or another, the
hukim are only indirectly related to G-d's ultimate goals of hesed and
tzedaka and mishpat. They may disagree on what kashrut does teach, but
they all agree it is educational, and neither intrinsically moral ( =
desirable to G-d) nor sacramental or mystical (I am following Rabbi
Danziger's view of Kabbalah according to Rav Hirsch, and not Dayan
Grunfeld's).

(An aside: Rav Hirsch criticizes Rambam for his taamei mitzvot, but
Rav Hirsch has more in common with Rambam than he admits. Rambam and
Rav Hirsch agree that the mitzvot are either intrinsically moral, or
that they somehow are educational or pedagogical or symbolic, and thus
indirectly conducive towards some moral goal. Thus, Rabbi Danziger in
his reply to Rabbi Elias, can say that Rav Hirsch is being "pure
Rambam" and not mystically Kabbalistic. For Rav Hirsch, the mitzvot
are not sacraments as they are to Kuzari and others.)

Another comment: we are brought to the vexed question of why G-d
commanded the rational commands, if they are indeed rational. Hovot
haLevavot is deeply troubled by this, and suggests that the generation
of the Exodus was so morally and rationally deficient, that these
needed these rational commands, but we do not today anymore. Rabbi Leo
Adler (a Hirschian), however, in his The Biblical View of Man (Urim
Publications), says that this shows the pernicious influence of Greek
philosophy; only such a philosophy, by extolling the power of
intellect (the yetzer hatov) and ignoring the power of emotion and
vice (in other words: the yetzer hara), could even ask the question of
why G-d should command these commands. For in fact, without the Divine
command, the rational mitzvot, though being rational, have no binding
force. So too Rabbi Berkovits: he says that Kant proved it is logical
to be moral, but who says it is obligatory for one to be logical?
Without a Divine command, it may be logical to be moral, but there is
no binding imperative to be so logically moral, unless G-d commands.
As an aside, Rav Saadia Gaon suggests that the rational commands are
needed to flesh out the precise laws of the rational commands, for we
can rationally conceive of their general laws but not in all their
details. Thanks to Rabbis Adler and Berkovits, we no longer need Rav
Saadia Gaon's solution. I will say, however, that we can borrow Rav
Saadia Gaon's idea for our own purposes: I will say that the
conscience and the intellect can indeed serve to assist in keeping
mitzvot: Rav Hirsch speaks of the voice of G-d speaking within you,
and I believe that the conscience and the intellect can act as general
guides to the directions as to what is right and wrong, and the
mitzvot serve to confirm and direct him in more precision. Indeed,
one's conscience and intellect are necessary to raise questions when
something seems wrong but the subject does not know of a particular
law; the conscience thus raises a flag that calls for further
investigation. Moreover, the posek in his halachic decisions must be
guided not only by empirical logical, but also by his sense of what
the overarching ethos of the law requires, as shown by Rabbi
Berkovits, Rabbi Eliezer Samson Rosenthal, Rebbetzin Blu Greenberg,
Rabbi Yehuda Amital, Dor Revi'i, and others (I am not sure about Rav
Soloveitchik; Rabbi Lau regarding Rabbi Rosenthal says Rabbi
Soloveitchik disagrees, but Professor Marc B. Shapiro brings Rabbi
Soloveitchik as being in agreement with Rabbi Yehuda Amital and Dor
Revi'i on this matter). With all this said, we can understand what Rav
Kook in Orot haTeshuva means when he says that sins cloud the
conscience; when one sins, his moral barometer is disrupted, and his
conscience no longer so clearly can flag potentially questionable
situations and morals.

(A random note: in speaking to R' David Glasner and to Rabbi
Berkovits's sons, I have established that Rabbi Berkovits, before
learning under Rabbi Yehiel Yaakov Weinberg, first learned under Rabbi
Akiva Glasner, Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner's son.)

Mikha'el Makovi