[Avodah] Changing God's Mind

[Michael Makovi]

> R' Micha Berger wrote:
> > By turning to the Borei one changes the factors that go
> > into His decision.
>
> R' Richard Wohlberg asked:
> > how would you respond to "If God is omniscient (and of course,
> > knows the future), then how can His mind be changed? In other
> > words, God knows what His decisions will be, so it's almost
> > an oxymoron to say that your prayers may change His decision.
>
> RRW is correct; we cannot change G-d's mind. For a given situation, If G-d feels that "A" is His response, there is nothing we can do change His mind to prefer the "B" response.
>
> But what we CAN do is to change the *situation*. We can become closer to Him in various ways, and then it's a whole new scenario. And perhaps our actions will have tipped the balance towards one of the many alternate situations in which "B" had been His chosen response from the beginning.
>
> Some may say I'm being simplistic. But to me it really seems simple.
>
> Akiva Miller

Indeed. I think it's the Hertz chumash on Hashem is not a man that He
changes His mind, that it notes that it cannot mean that His decrees
are irrevocable, because then what is prayer and teshuva? Rather, it
means that He does not arbitrarily change His mind without there being
a change in the person. But if the person changes his deeds, then
Hashem is dealing with a whole new situation, and this is not changing
His mind.

One might protest that Hashem already knew in the beginning that you'd
change your deeds, and so He really has changed His mind. That is,
when you were sinning and He decreed a punishment, He already knew
you'd do teshuva, but decreed a punishment nonetheless. Thus, when you
do do teshuva and He reverses the punishment, He has in fact changed
His mind, because He could have decreed a reward on the basis that
you'd have done teshuva by the time the punishment was to have taken
place.

But this is no real objection. It is merely a restatement (or perhaps
a corollary) of the paradox of free will versus omniscience. Whateover
resolution one takes, there is a resolution after all, and so the
above objection most certainly has a resolution, whatever it is.

I personally prefer the answer that His omnscience does not determine
our actions. He knows what we will do, but He doesn't cause us to do
it. In other words, He knows in advance what we will freely choose via
free will. Somewhere in Prof. Urbach's Chazal, he says that Rabbi
Akiva chooses this approach, but NOT on the basis of the famous Avot,
as he says this Avot is referring not to Hashem's knowing the future,
but rather the present (he bases this on the fact that Tannaitic uses
of the word in question refer to the present not the future) - saying
that He sees all and free choice is given merely means that you can do
whatever you want but Hashem will see it as you do it. It has nothing
to do with His seeing the future but your nevertheless having free
will. Nevertheless, Prof. Urbach later in the chapter on free will
says that Rabbi Akiva holds that His knowledge of the future doesn't
cause our deeds, and this is the answer to the paradox, but forget
which midrash he is basing this on.

Mikha'el Makovi