[Avodah] Does God Change His Mind?

[Michael Makovi]

R' Micha wrote:
> Michael Makovi wrote:
> > But also, describing what He isn't, makes absolutely no > > sense. If we say that He is merciful only to say that He is > > not cruel (but in truth, He is not merciful either), couldn't > > we just as well say that He is cruel so as to deny that He > > is merciful? ...

> Actually, mercy is not usually handled as a negative
> attribute.

Good point. I chose a bad example (and obviously need to refresh
myself on this subject), but nevertheless, what I said does I think
apply to those traits that are negative. If the trait ("A") is
asserted only to negate its opposite ("B"), but in fact neither A nor
B is true, then one could just as well assert
B to negate A. If I remember correctly, REB beat me to this argument.

>The Moreh discusses two kinds of attributes:
> 1) negative attributes. For existence "omnipotence" doesn't >mean that Hashem as infinite power as much as it means
> that limitations in power has nothing to do with the subject.
> 2) descriptions of His actions. Thus, G-d's Mercy is a
> description of how He acts to us. Rachamim, Din, etc...
> This is not merely illusion, saying that Hashem acted in a
> way that appears like mercy to us. It's intentionally setting > examples for imitatio Dei, "mah hu ... af atah
> ..."

First, if He is not really merciful, but only acts as-if merciful,
then what kind of example is this? I have a similar objection to the
Ramban who says that we aren't supposed to be merciful to the mother
bird because she merits such mercy, but only to train us to be
merciful. I forget where, but somewhere, I read the objection (with
which I concur) that if this were so, could not have Hashem commanded
us to be merciful to chairs and lightbulbs? If a bird does not merit
mercy, how can we learn from practicing mercy towards it? For I could
be merciful to my fellow man but cruel to the bird just as well as I
could be merciful to my fellow man but cruel to the kitchen table; if
a bird is undeserving of mercy, then presumably, it is totally
illegitimate for my learning as it is totally unrelated to any
legitimate targets of mercy. Rather, if Hashem told us to have mercy
on the bird, it presumes that the bird is a legitimate target for our
mercy.

Regarding a trait merely describing His action, I fail to see how this
does not make Hashem into an irrational capricious deity. If He is not
angry, but acts as if He is angry, then is He not behaving
unjustifiably capricious and cruel? For He apparently is behaving
without any reason for this behavior. And if one defends Him, saying
that the man (at whom Hashem is behaving as-if angry) sinned and
deserved this reaction from Hashem (even though Hashem is not actually
angry), and thus Hashem most certainly had justification and reason, I
would ask, if the man did something deserving of anger, and Hashem
acted as-if angry, then is it not reasonable to say that Hashem
actually was angry? In what way was He not angry? The man sinned,
Hashem has told us that He doesn't like it when we sin, and Hashem
responded as if He was angry at this sin...it certainly seems
reasonable to say that He actually truly didn't like it that the man
sinned.

> Before him, Rav Saadia listed the two above and made a
> third category:
> 1) attributed of our relationship to Him. Not of Hashem
> Himself, but in the relationship between Creator and
> created.
>
> I have specific citations and more discussion at
> <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2005/06/attributes-of-g-d.shtml>.

I also know the Kuzari had three categories. I know it was attributes
of grandeur and such, negative attributes, and a third category that I
cannot remember at the moment.

> > If He is neither merciful nor cruel, just say that He has no > > character traits at all, and leave Him as completely
> > undefined. To ascribe to Him something He is not, just to > > negate another thing that He is also not, when He is just > > as much not the one as He is not the other, is
> > completely nonsensical.

> His actions, which are truly motivated by his
> Incomprehensible Essence, are in concert with Mercy, not > cruelty. That's why we're called upon to develop the one
> and not the other. Vehalakhta bidrakhav.

If I understand you correctly (which I'm not sure I do), I responded
to this above in the section on Ramban and shiluach haken.

> > I recall that Rabbi Isidore Epstein in The Faith of Judaism > > says that many think that by denying Hashem character > > traits and personality, they're making Him higher, but
> > really, all they're doing is making Him meaningless for our lives.

> You do realize that you're citing RIE or REB isn't going to
> make much impression if you do not address how their
> positions address the concerns of primary sources like Rav > Saadia, the Rambam, the Kuzari, the Ikarim, etc...

REB explained himself, so I feel no need to do anything more (it
should be obvious that most of my arguments are simply reworded
versions of his). As for RIE, I'll admit that I'm having trouble
remembering what he says - I've been meaning to study his work again,
but being in the process of studying Rav Hirsch's chumash at the
moment is a small 4000 page barrier...lol

> > it is clear IMHO that Hashem does have some sort of
> > personality. The Tanach says He is merciful and that He > > punishes as does a father to a son, and I see no reason > > to take this at anything but face value.

> Because it makes no sense. It implies G-d is subject to Mercy, and thus not the Creator of everything.

Just because (of the disputed assertion that) He actually does have
mercy, doesn't mean He is subject to it. You seem to regard this mercy
as something outside Him to which He is subservient or influenced by.

Would we say that I am subject to my own personality? No! My
personality IS me! If I am subject to myself, yofi. I should hope that
Hashem is subject to Hashem.

Now, we would say that someone is subject to his own vices - someone
with an anger disorder is certainly subject to his anger. But this is
because this is an unbecoming quality of his yetzer hara which he is
to overcome. But would we say that a person is subject to his own
kindness? No! This is not a negative quality which we lament - it is a
positive quality which the person cultivated and strives to implement.

Now, the Kuzari disagrees with me. It says that mercy is a weakness,
for we see a poor man and give him money because it hurts us to see
him poor, but Hashem certainly cannot be weak and hurt like we are at
the site of a poor person.

Surprise surprise, I disagree with the Kuzari here. I cannot imagine
mercy being a weakness. If I am hurt by the sight of this poor man, it
means only that I have some humanity in me. It is not a weakness, but
rather a strength, if this sight hurts me. If someone is not hurt, it
indicates not strength, but rather weakness in him, something missing.
It indicates a severe spiritual illness if someone can look upon a
poor man and not be hurt. So already, to say that it would be a
weakness in Hashem if He felt pit on the poor man, is not so sure. I
haven't proved Hashem does feel pity, but I think I've shown that IF
He does feel pity, it isn't a weakness.

Now, Hashem says He feels for the poor, the widow, the orphan, etc. He
says His wrath will burn at their oppressor. Scriptural quotations
could be multiplied. I don't see why I shouldn't take these at face
value.

Now, REB says that the mercy and love and such are not parts of His
actual essence, but rather His traits of behaving towards us. I'm not
sure I understand REB here. We know that REB does not mean that Hashem
behaves as-if, because REB has already explicitly disagreed with this.
The only way left I see to understand REB then, is to say that Hashem
has attributes and traits of what He is, and others of how He behaves
and perceives us. What He is, is not dependent on anything else - if
He had never created the world, He'd still be the holy, lofty,
awesome, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent Hashem. But, by creating
a world and humans, He can feel pity and anger and show mercy and such
on humans. But He is not behaving as-if; He actually does feel for the
poor and the weak, He actually does feel indignant at idolatry and
crime, etc. etc.

> It implies He experiences time, and thus can have different > moods and motivations. It implies we can understand His
> true motivations, despite our being finite.

Well, we know that I hold that in His interactions with the world, He
actually is subject to time (and thus, your objection doesn't faze me;
according to your shita, of course, it is a formidable objection, and
precludes your adopting mine). My shita here would be b'shlama with my
interpretation of REB above, that Hashem has traits that are intrinsic
and don't rely on anything, and traits that depend on the world He has
created.

> > Similarly, Hashem in His essence or nature never
> > changes. BUT, with respect to us, Hashem changes His > > reaction. When we sin, He notices, and He acts
> > accordingly. Is this a change in Him? YES! And His
> > being angry at us is no less a change.

> Hashem in His essence never changes, but there is change > in Him. I fail to see the consistency here. Or does your
> notion of Hashem echad allow for G-d to have an essence
> as well as other things?

Apparently (I'm formulating my philosophic opinions on the fly), it does.

> > So if one is going to deny Him character traits and
> > personality, you'd better deny Him providence and activity > > in the world too, if you want to be consistent. With good > > reason did Aristotle make an Unmoved Mover. If Hashem > > has no character, why should He have behavior?

> Aristotle placed G-d within time and thus had a difference
> between creation and the running of the world. He therefore > could be a Deist, implying G-d as Cause while denying
> interaction since. However, with belief that every moment is > equally Caused, Desim doesn't work. Hashem is an
> unmoved mover, but the motion He caused/causes (trying
> for tenseless English) includes providence.

And as said, I cannot conceive of Hashem's interactions being anything
except in time. Until I can wrap my brain around your 4D sculpture,
I'll have to disagree with it. The 4D sculpture seems to imply that He
set everything up at Creation, to proceed until the end of time,
without any more input from Him (as indeed you interpret the Avot of
the ten things created at erev Shabbat). This still seems to me to be
davka denying Providence, and until I come to a correct understanding
of your intent, I'll have to continue to disagree.

> > > R' Micha:
> > > And yet EVERY seifer machashavim from a rishon that
> > > we till have agrees with this "Muslim-Aristotelian
> > > philosophy". Even the scraps we have left of Meqor
> > > Chaim (ibn Greirol) never mind more famous texts like
> > > RSG, the Rambam, the Ikkarim, Rashi on Chumash,
> > > the Kuzari.... WADR, that would make /me/ question  > > > my assumptions.

> > I (Mikha'el Makovi) wrote:
> > With the exception of Ikkarim and Kuzari, all of these
> > texts are heavily dependent on Aristotelian or
> > Mutakkilistic philosophy. Both of these are un-Jewish....

> If you believe that REB's thought is Jewish, but Rav Saadia > and Rashi aren't, there is nothing to discuss.

Let's deconflate what Jewish thought is. Jewish thought can either be
something originating with Jews (and presumably true) or something
held by Jews (and not necessarily true). The former is obvious. The
latter would mean that a Chassidic rebbe being Mashiach is Jewish
thought.

Now then, Rashi and RSG are obviously Jewish thought according to the
second definition, no question. According to the first definition, I'd
say that any foreign elements are simply not Jewish. They may still be
true, but not necessarily true. I think it is too obvious to be
questioned that Rambam relied on Aristotle in many things and RSG in
Mutakkilistic philosophy in many things. It doesn't mean that
everything they say is wrong; certainly both had many things original
to Torah, and even those things that are foreign aren't necessarily
false. What it does mean, however, is that anything not natively
Jewish, I can question.

B'kitzur, if it is not Sinaitic, I can question it. If Chazal didn't
see a problem with attributes (AFAIK, IMHO), then I am going to decide
against what seems to me in Ramban and RSG to be philosophical and not
natively Jewish.

REB, as far as I know, did not rely on any non-Jewish philosophy in
this area. Anyone correct me if I am wrong. In any case, even if he
did rely on non-Jewish philosophy, he didn't do so more than did the
opposing shita.


> > And let's say that every single rishon in the world holds
> > like this. However, Chazal are silent on this issue -
> > Chazal > never seem (AFAIK) to see a problem in
> > ascribing Hashem traits. Therefore, we should assume,  > > IMHO, that Chazal took the Tanach at face value and
> > indeed do ascribe traits to Hashem. The rishonim did an > > okimta, but Chazal did not.

At this point, I'll add a similar point that occurs to me: According
to Rambam and those like him, certain Chazalic texts were declared to
be forgeries (for example, Shiur Koma), because they offended the
religious sensibilities of Rambam etc., and they could not imagine
Chazal holding by such texts. Today, we know that such texts are
certainly authentic, and it simply means that Rambam's religious
sensibilities did not always coincide with Chazal's. It seem to me
that here too, while RSG and Rambam saw a problem with ascribing
traits to Hashem, maybe Chazal did not.

> Or that Chazal, believing in the baal peh nature of TSBP,
> didn't publish their theologies.

Midrashim?

Mikha'el Makovi