[Avodah] [Areivim] Chicken Scandal

[Chana Luntz]

RZS writes (responding to a post of mine that it would seem was never
published, at least as of the time of my writing):

> > 
> >> The Raavad/Mechaber position is that all we need to know
> >> about someone is that he is a Jew, and that we *not* know 
> >> anything negative about him. If his name is Cohen and we've 
> >> never heard of him before, and he tells us the food he's 
> >> selling is kosher, we can believe that he's telling the truth 
> >> to the best of his knowledge.  (We still have to worry about 
> >> how far his knowledge extends; but if he says he bought 
> >> everything as raw ingredients, or with a good hechsher, that 
> >> he bought his kelim new and has never used them for anything 
> >> else, etc, we don't need to worry that he's lying.)
> > 
> > On what basis do you understand the Raavad in this manner?
> 
> It's obvious.  No matter how trustworthy he is, he can only 
> know as much as he knows.  If he admits that he doesn't know 
> what he's talking about, can you possibly imagine that the 
> Raavad, or the Mechaber, would say that we can believe that 
> what he says is true? What if he honestly doesn't know that 
> pork is not kosher?  
> 

But if you know that he does not know (eg that pork is kosher) then he
has taken himself out of the chazaka, in a similar way to somebody who
had demonstrated his non trustworthyness takes himself out of the
chazaka (a spectacular example of which is the incident referred to in
the heading of this thread).  And while I agree that knowledge and
trustworthyness are two different things, as far as I can see the
principle behind chezkas kashrus as understood by the Mechaber/Raavad is
that one does not have to inquire to determine whether or not the person
is trustworthy *or knowledgeable*.  We rely on the basic chazaka that
Jewish people are trustworthy and sufficiently knowledgeable unless and
until they as individuals are shown not to be worthy of our trust and
reliance.  We are not required to faher him as to his knowledgeableness.
The chezkas kashrus is, according to some, based on the principle of rov
(ie that the majority of Jews do indeed know that pork is not kosher as
well as not being suspected of selling pork) or alternatively upon a
basic principle that this is (ie a basic level of knowledgeableness)
what constitutes a Jew.

> 
> >  The Raavad's
> > language is that we can eat by him even if he is an am ha'aretz. I 
> > would have thought that one of the potential issues with an am 
> > ha'aretz has to be that he is not knowledgeable.
> 
> In those days every Jew, even an am haaretz, knew basic 
> things, such as that meat must come from a shochet or a 
> kosher butcher, and it must be salted, that meat and milk 
> don't mix, etc., and that shaylos must be asked of a rov.  
> One could assume that if a Jew claimed that something was 
> kosher he knew what that meant, and therefore the only thing 
> one needed to worry about was that he might be dishonest.

But there are many many pratim that go into the keeping of kashrus over
and above those you have mentioned.

I suspect that what you are grappling with is the fact that today, we
have non religious Jews who are indeed so ignorant that they do not know
"that meat must come from a shochet or a kosher butcher, and it must be
salted, that meat and milk don't mix, etc., and that shaylos must be
asked of a rov."  But I doubt that you will find anybody who could be
defined as a "frum Jew" who has that level of ignorance.

Now the Aruch Hashulchan already had this part of the modern problem (ie
non religious Jews who are extraordinarily ignorant), although during
those times he probably did not have the second modern problem, that of
industrialisation and modern chemical technology.  The way the Aruch
Hashulchan dealt with it was to define the chezkas kashrus as only
applying to those Jews who were accustomed to going al pi das yisroel,
who put on tallis and tephillin, davened three times a day, washed his
hands for eating and instructed his household to do likewise (see Yoreh
Deah siman 119:11).  But he stresses that the person need not be a
talmid chacham or a tzadik just keep the basicis. 

Once you redefine the set to exclude those people who do not follow a
minimum amount of observance, then I think you will be hard placed to
find anybody who does not know "that meat must come from a shochet or a
kosher butcher, and it must be salted, that meat and milk don't mix,
etc., and that shaylos must be asked of a rov".  Ie you are back to your
classic am ha'aretz definition and the situation to which the rishonim
were referring.  If you find the rare person who does the basics but (as
per your example) lefi tumo says that he killed the chicken himself or
that he cooked it in milk, then that individual has taken himself out of
the chazaka.  But you do not have to, and are not required to, go asking
questions in order to elicit this information - or even to elicit the
information that indeed he understands that meat must come from a
shochet or kosher butcher and/or was cooked in milk.  You are to assume
he does until it is shown to be otherwise.


  To 
> that, the Raavad/Mechaber say that we needn't worry about 
> dishonesty, every Jew has a chezkat kashrut.  But if this 
> presumptively honest Jew says lefi tumo that he killed the 
> chicken himself, or that he cooked it in milk, then it is 
> simply impossible that the Raavad or the Mechaber would 
> permit eating it, simply because a Jew put it in front of 
> one, or said that it was "kosher".
> 
> 
> > Once you have to start investigating his level of knowledge, then 
> > surely whole idea that simply knowing his name is Cohen is enough 
> > falls by the wayside?
> 
> No, because the issue they're dealing with is his 
> trustworthiness, not his knowledge.  They say that any Jew 
> should be presumed to be telling the truth *as he knows it*, 
> so long as we don't have a specific reason to suspect 
> otherwise, and that the mere fact that he could profit by 
> lying doesn't count as a reason to suspect him.
>

But the language of the various sources is not about trusting or not
trusting his statement of "kosher".  It is about eating from him or not
eating from him.  Ie nowhere do we have a statement from him that
something is (or is not) kosher, it is just implicit in terms of the
interaction (ie giving to eat or buying).  And until he is established
as falling into the category of one who is chashud it is OK to eat from
him or buy from him (at least according to the Mechaber/Ravaad).  Now
one might be chashud with respect to an issur due to untrustworthyness
or it might equally well be due to ignorance, but at the end of the day,
that person is suspected of an issur or not, as the case may be.  With
the principle that we do not suspect until we have reason to do so, and
therefore we do not go out and investigate in order to establish him as
being trustworthy and knowledgeable.

This is specifically contrasted to the situation of shechita and related
(nikur etc) (and according to the Rambam, various other issurim) where
it is important that one buys from or has a shochet mumcha.  The point
about of a mumcha is that he is knowledgeable as well as G-d fearing-
and while we have a different principle, ie that rov mitzuim etzel
shechita mumchim hem", this is much weaker than the general principle.
It is indeed appriopriate to faher a shochet to check he knows his stuff
before allowing him to shecht and not just rely on the fact that his
name is Cohen (or as per the Aruch HaShulchan, his name is Cohen and he
appears to follow basic observance).


...
> 
> >Hence the argument today ie that "because of all the additives and
the 
> >industrialisation of the food industry kashrus has become so complex
that you need 
> >haschgacha"  seems to me in effect to be an argument that what once 
> >applied vis a vis shechita only is now to be applied more generally
> 
> Yes, that is indeed what makes our times different than those 
> of the Shulchan Aruch.

And that as, I understand it, is the argument that today we should
pasken like the Rambam rather than the Shulchan Aruch.

There are of course various counter arguments.  The one I have brought
up on this list, however is that, while indeed food technology is more
complex than it used to be, kashrus has always been complex, and the
amei ha'aretz have historically not been very knowledgeable.  What they
have always known, however, is the basic essentials - particularly in
relation to issurei d'orisa.  And where (as in the case of shechita)
there was a risk of ignorance leading to a violation of an fundamental
issur d'orisa, then the chachamim acted to require a mumcha (or a
chaver).  To the extent that additives and industrialisation has led to
clear cut issurei d'orisa then maybe it would be appropriate to imitate
the actions of the chachamim (although the question of our ability to
institute gezeros might be raised).  But to the extent that we are
talking about anything less than that, maybe we should be hesitant to
tamper with community dynamics as valued by the majority poskim.

> -- 
> Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with 

Regards

Chana